

15 August 1978

EXTERNAL TRAINING

1. The use of external training to satisfy CIA training needs is only used in instances when internal training would be more expensive or cannot provide the subject matter. The wide variety of academic disciplines and skills which CIA seeks in training in effect matches the range of knowledge and skills utilized in collecting and analyzing intelligence information. In external training heavy emphasis is placed on scientific and technical subjects, economics, specialized foreign area studies, and those foreign languages which are not cost beneficial to conduct internally. External training also covers the enrollment of personnel in such government programs as nuclear weapons, guided missiles, logistics, and selected medical technology courses.
2. As noted, the increase represents a combination of deferrals and escalating costs and the proposed reduction of \$0.5 million would diminish CIA's ability to stay-up with the state-of-the-art developments in many critical intelligence areas. Holding at this level over a sustained period would thus affect CIA's capability to remain ahead in the offensive-defensive intelligence struggle with our major foreign adversaries.
3. It should be noted there is an overlap of \$215,000 between "internal training" and "external training." This results from the use of a sub-object class to denote external training and organizational identification for internal training. Thus, the reductions in both internal training and external training, taken together, would to some measure cut out the same funds twice.

The Committee's Surveys and Investigations Staff conducted an in depth review of CIA training. This review covered both internal and external training.

The investigation found that reductions could be made in the costs of both internal and external training without seriously impairing the effectiveness of the Agency. The results of this study were given to the Central Intelligence Agency.

Based upon the investigative study, the Congress agreed to a general reduction of \$1.0 million in the FY 1978 training budget. While the report did not specifically specify that reductions should be made in both external and internal training, that conclusion should have been easily implied from both the tenor of the questions at the hearing and a careful reading of the Investigative Report which was made available to the Agency. In spite of this fact, the Agency chose to make all of the reduction in external training and made no reduction in internal training. That was not the intent of the Committee. The Committee has made a reduction of \$1.0 million in FY 1979 and specifically identified the reduction as being in internal training so there can be no ambiguity as to what is intended.

External Training Should Be Held to the FY
1978 Level (-\$.5 Million)

As noted earlier, the CIA did make a significant reduction in external training in FY 1978. However, the FY 1979 budget proposes to restore much of this reduction. This restoration is based upon the need to reinstate external training which was "deferred" in FY 1978. The Committee's intent was not to defer external training, but to permanently reduce the level of such training. Therefore, the Committee has made a reduction of \$.5 million to reduce external training to the FY 1978 level. This reduced level will still be almost \$2.0

million, which should be adequate for an agency of approximately

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SECTION II

EXTERNAL TRAINING

1. The Report (p. x) recommends that the Agency reevaluate its external training program, particularly its use of the management and executive development programs at nongovernment facilities. The Agency's Training Selection Board, chaired by the Director of Training, undertook just such a reevaluation in FY 1976 with the result that some executive programs were dropped. Only a few were retained, with decreased Agency participation, and they are within close proximity to the Washington, DC area. Sponsorship of Agency employees to attend the Advanced Management Program at Harvard was dropped completely; CIA participation in Harvard's Program for Management Development was reduced from four persons a year to two last year, and in FY 1978 none will be sponsored.

2. The Report (p. xi) discusses Agency participation at senior service schools and military-sponsored schools or war colleges. It should be noted that the basis of Agency participation in these schools goes beyond the statement in the report: "Such training can broaden one's total professional perspective and can lead to the development of useful work-related contacts..." Under the guidance from a former DCI, participation was regarded as important not only for personal and career development, but also for the purpose of increasing the understanding of CIA and foreign intelligence throughout the U.S. Government. CIA students are carefully selected, and the interface with individuals from the Intelligence Community, the military services, and other federal agencies is a vital ingredient and valuable to the Agency.

3. The Report raises questions on several instances of full-time external training as follows:

a. Two individuals attended schools outside the Washington area--in Pennsylvania (p. 66).

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training on a priority basis prior to his next overseas

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Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania State University, Harvard University, and Cornell University. The Report fails to note that the FEI accepts only GS-16s and higher graded employees for this program. Only in rare instances will FEI approve a waiver for a GS-15. The Agency personnel who attend the four university management programs are GS-14s and GS-15s.

5. The Report (p. 67) questions CIA's participation in the CSC Education for Public Management (EPM) Fellowship Programs. These have been under continual review by OTR and attendance has been cut back sharply; whereas in FY 1976 the Agency had six participants, in FY 1977 there is only one.

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